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ABSTRACT 
 
Enterprise systems need reliable, flexible and secure means for making public and confidential 
information available to users in a secured and trusted manner. Although enterprise systems 
have variety of choice to authenticate these users, organizations face significant issues when 
granting access and providing a manageable structure for valuable access control.  Logon 
functionalities such as user name and password algorithm have been used to grant 
authentication and authorization into enterprise systems network resources. Since most systems 
clients prefer the ease of using passwords, and since passwords are easily compromised, the 
urgency for a stronger authentication process becomes paramount.  This study  performed an 
internal evaluation of enterprise systems such as rating the effectiveness of a security platform as 
well as an external evaluation; i.e., analyzing how a security system is been rated by external 
entities. The study will examine correlations between system security best practices and reported 
or observed outcomes. The study  concluded by evaluating the use of added protective layers to 
the two or multi-factor authentication security system.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Enhancement in information access has necessitated new challenges to users for the fortification 
of susceptible data and systems resources against emergent number of security risks and theft 
related issues.  Enterprise systems have witnessed breaches and malicious intrusions into 
network systems.  This has raised the standard for security compliance by system engineers as 
they struggle to protect network vulnerabilities and meet regulatory compliance.  With the rising 
number of data security breaches and the increasing sophistication of cybercrime, protecting 
access to organization critical data and systems becomes a major necessity.  
 
System gurus comprehend the potential threats posed to their networks and are devising means to 
cope with those threats and implement sustainable solutions.  As businesses strive for 
transparency, interoperability and mobility, respective corporate networks become susceptible to 
threats from a third party whose security apparatus is not subject to audits and control 
mechanism by the system (Altman, 2006).  Systems employees are given administrative 
privileges to enable such individuals perform their administrative duties. Such rights could be 
compromised by disgruntled employees, contractors, vendors, or temporary workers, thereby 
allowing critical security services to be inoperable. 
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Several enterprise systems use Internet filtering tools such as intrusion detection software and 
firewalls to protect valuable data on their systems, but additional security measures are needed to 
safeguard the loss of intellectual properties and other valuable data on a system. Most of these 
companies do not have enforcement apparatus to enforce compliance or to report on suspicious 
activities (Resencrance, 2004).  Phishers are constantly circumventing the two-multi factor 
authentication scheme by implementing man-in-the middle attacks.  Due to this loophole in the 
enterprise policy security infrastructure, corrective measures to detect and prevent threats from 
malware, hackers, malicious users, become paramount. 
  
According to Andress (2006), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported that identity theft 
affected nearly 90 million Americans and cost approximately $173 billion in 2005.  Also, 
Skoudis (2005) found evidence that worldwide identity theft and related crimes could cost 
businesses about $532 billion in losses by the end of 2010.  
  
Since most end-users and various enterprise clients perform a fraction of their business 
transactions at their respective local offices, the need for a reliable and secured authentication 
mechanism cannot be overstated.  End-users, who engage extensively on electronic services, 
complain that passwords have become difficult to remember (Andress, 2006).  Most of the 
systems require password changes every 90 days and this makes it cumbersome to remember 
which password was used within a given period.  
 
Logon functionalities of user name and password algorithm have been used to grant 
authentication and authorization into enterprise systems network resources. Although 
authentication provides system administrators with valuable information about who is accessing 
the application, users get frustrated remembering user name and logon IDs.  Since passwords can 
be compromised, the urgency for a stronger authentication process becomes paramount.  
 
Solutions to these problems could include the fortification of the Enterprise Network Security 
platform and the addition of more security layers for a stronger multifactor authentication 
process. A strong authentication process should include, but not limited to, a device or 
information that the user possesses. These could include a hardware token or a barometric 
characteristic or some information or code that the user knows. An example would be a Personal 
Identification Number (PIN).  Other examples might include smart cards or  badges.  
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Ofir (2005), Lu, Liu, Yu, and Yao (2005), Ryker and Bhutta  (2005),  Opara (2004), Pescatore, 
Nicolett, and Orans (2004), and Krim (2003) among others have noted that in the past few years, 
systems security administrators have seen a decline in recreational hacking, and an increase in 
commercial hacking. Skoudis (2005) reiterated by stressing the importance of data protection in 
this digital environment.  
 
Potential proliferation and the persistency of professional hackers have lead to the desire of 
enterprise security administrators to protect crucial systems from unauthorized access (Vijayan, 
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2006).  If data and information are not protected, enterprise systems could lose the confidence of 
customers as well as shareholders. 
 
Vijayan (2006) stressed that by end of calendar year 2009, the annual amount of money spent on 
security software support services in the United States could surpass $920 million dollars. 
Skoudis (2005) argued that by year-end 2008, 95 percent of enterprise systems will have 
implemented network access control policies and procedures to guide the network system. 
 
Vijayan (2006) and Jain (2005) in a recent study, identified some key market drivers as the 
reason for a stronger security platform and authentication.  These are increasing open networks 
capabilities, the extended mobile users that connect to enterprise networks, the continuous 
weakness of passwords as a security mechanism, the increased number of online users, the 
increased emphasis on policy and regulatory compliance issues across the industries.  
  
Ofir (2005), Scholtz (2004), Opara and Rob (2003), among others argued that speaker 
verification and speech recognition technologies provide viable secure caller authentication 
techniques with no constraint for physical tokens.   
  
When considering a good solution for office to office connectivity, especially when a small 
number of trusted users access the LAN from managed corporate PCs, the network layer IPSec 
VPNs will be an ideal connectivity component (Altman, 2006).  
  
Ewing (2006), Jepson (2006), Gage (2007), Price (2007) among others, conclude that the 
authentication market for enterprise systems would continue to grow at an exponential rate 
during the next few years as businesses seek to protect access to enterprise network resources. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Determining the buoyancy level and adequacy of a stronger authentication methodology as a 
barrier to network systems intrusions, a survey was conducted to access users’ perception and 
understanding of the importance of a strong authentication system. User profiling in terms of 
setup time will also used.  The survey instrument was distributed randomly to Business 
Intelligence (BI) professional at the 2008 International Microwave IT symposium in Atlanta 
Georgia.  Some of the target participants included professionals from Informatica, SAP Business 
Objects,  Netezza,   MicroStrategy Inc., IBM, Dataupia, Baseline Consulting, and DataFlux.  Of 
the 644 surveys originally distributed, 201 were fully completed and 17 were rejected for lack of 
completion.   The two hundred and one fully completed surveys represent a response rate of 32.2 
percent (201/(644-17)). The responses were assigned weights that were summed to indicate the 
trends for more fortified security authentication technology.  The authors noted that beyond an 
appeal to help the researchers, respondents were not offered any other incentives to complete the 
surveys.   
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RESULTS FROM DATA ANALYSIS DIALOG 
 
The authors identified two of the variables from the survey as “outcome” variables. The 
designated outcome variables were #5 (How strongly do you agree to the effectiveness of the 
security systems of your organization?) and #9 (How do your customers, vendors, partners, 
suppliers, clients, and others agencies rate your security systems?). 
  
One variable, #6 (Have there been security system breaches in your organization?)  was viewed 
as a possible outcome variable as well as a contributing variable.  All other variables dealt with 
technical aspects of security and were viewed as contributing to the outcome variables. 
  
The authors realized that some transformations of the data would be required before meaningful 
statistical analysis could be performed.   Most of the contributing variables had a few responses 
of “don’t know” or “not sure”.  These variables were transformed into binary variables where 1 = 
“yes” and 0 = “not yes” (“no” or “not sure” or “don’t know”).  This transformation allowed the 
use of these contributing variables as binary “dummy variables” in linear regression analyses. 
  
Before the authors tried to analyze the outcome variables in terms of their relationships to 
contributing variables, the authors tried to use factor analysis to reduce the number of 
contributing variables.  High correlations between contributing variables indicated that such a 
reduction might be possible.  The results of the factor analysis procedure did not yield 
significant, useful reductions.  Four composite factors emerged which could explain 71% of the 
variation in the set of six contributing variables.  The 29% of remaining unexplained variation 
was deemed too large to justify reduction from six to four variables. 
  
The authors tried to use the contributing variables to predict the values of variable #6 (Have there 
been security system breaches in your organization?).  Using stepwise linear regression, the 
authors found that no contributing variable met the entry criterion of p = .05.  This was not 
particularly surprising when you consider that variable #6 was not a true measure, but only an 
estimate made by respondents.  There may have been many system breaches that respondents did 
not know about.    
  
The authors were successful in using stepwise linear regression to find a predictive relationship 
between internal confidence in the system (outcome variable, #5) and two contributing variables.  
The two significant contributing variables were variable #6 (Breaches in the system), and 
variable #8 (frequency of password changes). 
  
The overall percentage of all respondents who had confidence in their own security system was 
53.7%.  Table (1) below shows that the first variable to enter into the predictive model for 
internal confidence is variable 6 (Breaches in the system).  Variable #6 entered the model with a 
negative coefficient.  This means the more that users observed or recognized breaches in the 
security system, the lower the predicted confidence in the system.  With this variable in the 
predictive model, the constant is 67.5%, 13.8 percentage points higher than the base case (with 
no predictive variables). That means that for respondents who reported no breaches, the 
predicted percentage indicating confidence was 67.5%.  For respondents who reported no 
breaches, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence was 64.0%.  
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The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was -.259.  This factor is used within the 
predictive model for respondents who reported breaches.  For those who reported breaches, the 
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 67.5% – 25.9% = 41.6%.     
For respondents who reported breaches, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the 
system was 42.0%. 
 
Table 1:  Predictive Models for Internal Confidencea. 
      
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .675 .058  13.304 .000 
    V#6  
reaches 
-.259 .052 -.333 -4.980 .000 
2 (Constant) .564 .100  5.639 .000 
V#6 breaches -.212 .054 -.273 -3.906 .000 
V#8 pw_freq .124 .048 .180 2.581 .011 
a. Dependent Variable: Internal 
 
After variable #6 was included into the predictive model, variable #8 (How often are you 
required to change your password?) entered the predictive model. Unlike variable #6, which had 
a negative coefficient in the predictive model, variable #8 had a positive coefficient.  This means 
the more often users are required to change their passwords, the higher the predicted confidence 
in the system. 
  
With variable #6 and variable #8 in the predictive model, the constant is 56.4%, 2.7 percentage 
points higher than the base case (with no predictive variables). That means that for respondents 
who reported no breaches, and very low frequency for required password changes, the predicted 
percentage indicating Internal Confidence was 56.4%.  For respondents who reported no 
breaches and very low frequency for required password changes, the ACTUAL percentage 
indicating confidence was 60.0%.  
 
The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was .124.  This factor is used within the 
predictive model for respondents who reported a high frequency for required password changes.  
For those who reported no breaches and a high frequency for required password changes, the 
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 56.4% + 12.4% = 68.8%.     
For respondents who reported no breaches and a high frequency for required password changes, 
the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the system was 64.4%. 
 
For those who reported  breaches and a high frequency for required password changes, the 
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 56.4% - 21.2% + 12.4% = 47.6%.     
For such respondents, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the system was 44.4%.  These 
results are summarized in Table 2 below.  
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Table 2:   Predicted and Reported Percentages of Internal Confidence. 
Reported 
Breaches 
Reported Frequent 
Password Change 
Predicted Internal 
Confidence(%) 
Reported Internal 
Confidence(%) 
No No 67.5% 64.0% 
Yes No 41.6% 42.0% 
No Yes 68.8% 64.4% 
Yes Yes 47.6% 44.4% 
  
After analyzing internal confidence in the security system, the authors were successful in finding 
a predictive relationship between External Confidence in the system ( How do your customers, 
vendors, partners, suppliers, clients, & others agencies rate your security systems) and the same 
two contributing variables (#6 & #8) which were significant predictors of Internal confidence.  
The percentage of all respondents who reported External Confidence (outcome variable, #9) was 
47.3%.  Table (3) below shows that the first variable to enter into the predictive model is variable 
6 (Breaches in the system).  Variable #6 entered the model with a negative coefficient.  This 
means that the more users observed or recognized breaches in the security system, the lower the 
predicted confidence in the system.  With this variable in the predictive model, the constant is 
87.8%, 40.5 percentage points higher than the base case (with no predictive variables).  For 
respondents who reported no breaches, the predicted percentage indicating confidence was 
87.8%.  For such respondents, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence was 92.0%.  
 
Table 3:  Predictive Models for External Confidencea.    
         
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .878 .051  17.208 .000 
V#6  breaches -.440 .045 -.566 -9.685 .000 
2 (Constant) 1.081 .087  12.387 .000 
V#6  breaches -.485 .047 -.623 -10.240 .000 
V#8  pw_freq .119 .042 .173 2.841 .005 
a. Dependent Variable: External 
 
The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was -.440.  This factor is used within the 
predictive model for respondents who reported breaches.  For those who reported breaches, the 
predicted percentage indicating confidence in the system would be 87.8% – 44.0% = 43.8%.     
For such respondents, the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence in the system was 40.2%. 
After variable #6 was included into the predictive model, variable #8 (How often are you 
required to change your password?) entered the predictive model. Unlike variable #6, which had 
a negative coefficient in the predictive model, variable #8 had a positive coefficient.  This means the more 
often users are required to change their passwords, the higher the predicted confidence in the system. 
Enterprise Systems Network: SecurID Solutions, Authentication to GSS E. U. Opara & V. Etnyre 
 
© International Information Management Association, Inc, 2010 27  ISSN:  1543-5962-Printed Copy       ISSN:  1941-6679-On-line Copy 
With variable #6 and variable #8 in the predictive model, the constant is 108.1%, 20.3 
percentage points higher than the base case.  For respondents who reported no breaches, and very 
low frequency for required password changes, the predicted percentage indicating confidence 
was more than 100%.  For such respondents (reported no breaches and very low frequency for 
required password changes), the ACTUAL percentage indicating confidence was 94.1%.  
  
The coefficient for variable #6 in the predictive model was .119.  For those who reported  
breaches and a high frequency for required password changes, the predicted percentage 
indicating confidence in the system would be 108.1% - 48.5% + 11.9% = 72.5%.     For such 
respondents, the ACTUAL percentage reporting confidence in the system was 66.7%.  This data 
is summarized in Table 4, below. 
 
Table 4:   Predicted and Reported Percentages of External Confidence. 
 
Reported 
Breaches 
Reported Frequent 
Password Change 
Predicted External 
Confidence(%) 
Reported External 
Confidence(%) 
No No 87.8% 92.0% 
Yes No 43.8% 42.0% 
Yes Yes 72.5% 66.7% 
                                 
As a final step in the analysis of data, the authors decided to add the variable #5, Internal 
confidence, to the set of contributing variables in the model to predict variable #8, External 
Confidence, and to add External Confidence to the set of contributing variables in the model to 
predict Internal Confidence.  Adding variable #5 (Internal Confidence) to the set of contributing 
variables did not change the model for predicting variable #8, External Confidence.  This makes 
sense since people outside of an organization will not usually be influenced by (or even know) 
the opinions of insiders about system security. 
 
 As a contributing variable, however, variable #8 (External Confidence) was significant 
for predicting variable #5, Internal confidence.  This can be seen in the third step of the stepwise 
regression analysis shown below. 
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Table  5:  Predictive models for internal confidencea. 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .675 .058  13.304 .000 
Breaches -.259 .052 -.333 -4.980 .000 
2 (Constant) .564 .100  5.639 .000 
Breaches -.212 .054 -.273 -3.906 .000 
pw_freq .124 .048 .180 2.581 .011 
3 (Constant) .402 .132  3.032 .003 
Breaches -.139 .067 -.179 -2.085 .038 
pw_freq .141 .049 .206 2.913 .004 
External .150 .078 .150 1.985 .046 
a. Dependent Variable: internal 
 
This chart shows that a high level of confidence in system security by people outside of an 
organization can increase the predicted confidence of people inside the organization.  The last 
line of the table shows that this increase can be as large as 15 percentage points. 
 
ENTERPRISE SECURID – STANDARD FOR STRONG TWO OR MULTI FACTOR 
AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
Since a single factor approach such as a password alone provides a low proof of authentication, 
the addition of a subsequent substantial proof assures that the authenticity will be elevated. 
 
Wells Fargo Bank and Bank of America among other banks are examples of a widely used form 
of two/multi factor authentication technology.  A multifactor authentication uses two or three 
different ways to authenticate users’ profile. These include the use of a password or a knowledge 
based authentication such as response to a challenge question.  
 
Another way is a physical apparatus, such as a smart card with a chip embedded into the cell, or 
hardware token that generates a one time passwords. A third component for identifying a user 
might be biometric technology. A fingerprint or an iris scan serves this purpose. Collectively, a 
multifactor approach uses a password and a second or third factor as stipulated in the figures 
below to authenticate the user in Figures 1, 2 and 3 (Gage,  2006). 
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Figure 1:  How the System works. 
Enterprise 
hashed 
Passcode 
store
Enterprise Network User on-line (Network Connected)
Enterprise 
Network/Server
[A] Username and passcode
[B] Username and passcode provided 
to NetworkServer along with date/time 
of last available passcode
[E] Username, Windows 
password supplied to AD
Enterprise Systems 
Domain Controller
[C] and [D]. Agent is told 
Authentication was successful and is 
provided:
- Windows password
- Ticket for hashed passcode retrieval
[G]  Network/Server provides to 
passcode store:
- Hashed passcodes
- Emergency access password
- Encrypted Windows password (for 
use when offline)
[F] Emmans Ticket 
supplied to desktop
 
Source: Gage,  2006. 
Figure 2:  User off-line (Network disconnected).
Enterprise 
hashed 
Passcode 
store
Enterprise Network/Server
1. Username and passcode, 
or emergency access code
2. Username and Passcode
(or emergency access code)
5. Username, Windows password
6. Offline 
Emmanues
ticket
Systems
cached 
credentials
3 and 4. Authentication successful
- Decrypted Windows password
Desktop
 
Source: Gage, 2006. 
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Figure 3:  Solutions at a banking ATM. 
Solving the Password Problem
 Combine something you have ...
 User ATM card, for example
• ... with something user knows...
— user PIN
+ PIN
 
Source:  Ewing, 2006. 
 
Authentication choices fall into three categories, see Figure 4. The single factor which is the 
password and policy alone is very weak. The two-factor approach, which includes a combination 
of two pins, is not bullet proof. The multi-factor approach combines the two factor authentication 
and an additional factor such as a biometrics (Grey et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 4:  Authentication Choices. 
[Low]   Authentication Strength    [High]
Weaker Authentication StrongerAutentication
Password
Policy
+
PIN
+
PIN
Single factor Two factor
+
+
PIN
+
Multi factor
PASSWORD
POLICY
 
Source: Grey et al., 2005. 
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Table 6:   Authentication solutions. 
Security Levels 
Authorization – RACF ETC Level 
This level identifies if the user is allowed to do what they’re trying to accomplish on the system 
Authentication Level 
This is level where multifactor or secured two-factors determine if the user is actually who he or 
she says they are. 
Privacy Level 
This level uses the security technology of Secured Socket Layer [SSL] to protect un-authorized 
user from accessing user’s data 
Non Repudiation Level 
This level prevents the user from claiming that they did not authorize the transaction etc. 
Source: Ofir, 2005. 
As Table 6 indicates, an example of an authorization gadget is a password. This device makes it 
possible for the system to approve the requestor access into the system, as the true holder of the 
password. However, for additional level of security, it becomes paramount for the system to 
authenticate the user (Ofir, 2005). This process supposedly will guarantee that the user or the 
holder of the password is actually who they claim they are as they attempt to logon to the 
network. There are now breakthroughs in latest security apparatus that can be used in 
combination with passwords to identify authorized users, see Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5:   Complete analysis of an Enterprise Network Security Architecture 
 
Enterprise Network Security Platform/Architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Prince, 2007. 
The enterprise network security architecture is comprised of the ENSP and the ENSI. Together, 
both elements are built into an enterprise architectural landscape that is able to capture, analyze 
and remediate security problems in real time.  
Network Security Policy 
Enterprise Security Behavioral Analytic 
Enterprise Network Security Central 
 
Enterprise 
Network 
Security 
Platform 
[ENSP] 
 
Enterprise 
Secure 
Network 
Infrastructure 
[ENSI] 
Switches Routers 
IP applications, etc 
Connection 
to Network 
and Systems 
Management 
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As shown in the diagram above, enterprise network security platform (ENSP) is the central 
command facility that acts on the security information intercepted in the processing chain. The 
ENSP functionalities include the control, analytics and policy functions.  
 
In order to enable enterprise centralized network security management and administration 
perform properly, the control phase ensures that all dubious information and other surveillance 
information collected from the ESNI are aggregated for analysis. 
 At the Analytics phase, data that have been stored and analyzed for behavioral anomalies are re-
evaluated.  These analyses could be a result of historic events on systems vulnerabilities and 
abnormalities on traffic patterns.   
At the Policy phase, systems protective policy implementation is configured through the ENSP 
policy engine. This mechanism accelerates enforcement procedures based on established 
benchmarks. These include but not limited to gateways, access rights, ports, protocols and traffic 
anomalies.  
The other component of the network security architecture is the Enterprise Network Secured 
Infrastructure (ENSI).  These components are comprised of several routers, switched, IP 
applications, scanners, security and observatory apparatus that are in the processing chain. The 
ENSI perform the Enterprise Network Observatory and Enforcement duties.   
In the Network Observatory phase, each periphery monitors enterprise network traffic flow for 
abnormities as data passes their respective locations.  
In the Enforcement phase, imbedded filtering features permit each periphery to perform the 
duties of an Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) when prompted by a systems command. 
The end result is that the ENSA is able to centralize security automaton enforcement thereby 
enhancing operational efficiency and productivity.  
 
IMPLICATIONS TO BUSINESS AND SYSTEMS SECURITY GURUS 
 
Systems security and network professional are constantly faced with new challenges. One of 
these challenges is that the networks gurus will continuously scrutinize the network for 
unscrupulous, dubious and unauthorized peripheries that could cause a breach in security. 
Another challenge that these gurus face is unending scrutiny on suspected problematic areas as 
they are detected.  Since 911 incidents, systems security is now an on-going venture, and as such, 
these experts will be expected to develop breakthroughs to safeguard the enterprise.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this study has shown, without a strong authentication mechanism, no functionality in SSL 
would avert a trespasser from getting biometric or keystroke recordings and impersonating an 
authorized user. The notion of Network Security Architecture is exclusive because it assumes an 
architectural approach. Combinations of this approach with a two-factor or a multi-factor 
approach will increase the security infrastructure of a system. Enterprise systems gurus whose 
organizational goals are to maximize their return on investment and exceed their customers’ 
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expectations, should implement vendor-neutral solutions that work with their existing 
infrastructure thereby enabling the system to quarantine and destroy threats from malware and 
unknown or non-compliant users. 
 
Breakthroughs and innovative ventures are now in place that defines policies, controls and 
analytic measures that are now implemented to system-wide platforms.  Enterprise system clients 
and end-users whose businesses necessitate thorough security measures are implementing 
Security SecurID multifactor authentication as the flag bearer for protecting network systems. 
The study shows that there is no definite solution at this moment to fully eliminate every threat.  
However, system security gurus should continue to upgrade policies, assess threats and 
implement control mechanism that will consistently manage and protect network security 
apparatus. 
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